Cooperation, collective action, and the archeology of large-scale societies

Archeologists investigating the emergence of large-scale societies in the past have renewed interest in examining the dynamics of cooperation as a means of understanding societal change and organizational variability within human groups over time. Unlike earlier approaches to these issues, which used models designated voluntaristic or managerial, contemporary research articulates more explicitly with frameworks for cooperation and collective action used in other fields, thereby facilitating empirical testing through better definition of the costs, benefits, and social mechanisms associated with success or failure in coordinated group action. Current scholarship is nevertheless bifurcated along lines of epistemology and scale, which is understandable but problematic for forging a broader, more transdisciplinary field of cooperation studies. Here, we point to some areas of potential overlap by reviewing archeological research that places the dynamics of social cooperation and competition in the foreground of the emergence of large-scale societies, which we define as those having larger populations, greater concentrations of political power, and higher degrees of social inequality. We focus on key issues involving the communal-resource management of subsistence and other economic goods, as well as the revenue flows that undergird political institutions. Drawing on archeological cases from across the globe, with greater detail from our area of expertise in Mesoamerica, we offer suggestions for strengthening analytical methods and generating more transdisciplinary research programs that address human societies across scalar and temporal spectra

Endless forms: human behavioural diversity and evolved universals

Human populations have extraordinary capabilities for generating behavioural diversity without corresponding genetic diversity or change. These capabilities and their consequences can be grouped into three categories: strategic (or cognitive), ecological and cultural-evolutionary. Strategic aspects include: (i) a propensity to employ complex conditional strategies, some certainly genetically evolved but others owing to directed invention or to cultural evolution; (ii) situations in which fitness payoffs (or utilities) are frequency-dependent, so that there is no one best strategy; and (iii) the prevalence of multiple equilibria, with history or minor variations in starting conditions (path dependence) playing a crucial role. Ecological aspects refer to the fact that social behaviour and cultural institutions evolve in diverse niches, producing various adaptive radiations and local adaptations. Although environmental change can drive behavioural change, in humans, it is common for behavioural change (especially technological innovation) to drive environmental change (i.e. niche construction). Evolutionary aspects refer to the fact that human capacities for innovation and cultural transmission lead to diversification and cumulative cultural evolution; critical here is institutional design, in which relatively small shifts in incentive structure can produce very different aggregate outcomes. In effect, institutional design can reshape strategic games, bringing us full circle